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COMPARING POLITICAL SPEECH AND GENERAL CONVERSATION 
WITHIN THE THEORY OF RELEVANCE 
The aim of the present paper is to check whether the theory of relevance 
possesses  sufficient  explanatory  power  to  describe  political  speech  and  to 
distinguish political speech from general conversation. Moreover, it is intended 
to differentiate between two types of rhetoric of two political parties. 
The  paper  consists  of  five  sections.  The  first  section  provides  a  brief 
summary  of  that  part  of  the  theory  of  relevance  which  is  essential  for  the 
conducted analysis. The second section describes the data analysed in the present 
paper, whereas the third presents sample analyses of the data. Two final sections 
of the article deal with conclusions; the fourth section presents conclusions based 
on the analysis of the whole corpus, whereas the fifth section features overall 
conclusions as regards the explanatory power of the theory of relevance. 
Theoretical preliminaries 
Within the relevance framework (Sperber and Wilson (1996)) processing a 
stimulus  starts  in  peripheral  input  system  where  a  string  of  sounds  is 
automatically decoded into a logical form. Logical form is an ordered set of 
concepts forming an assumption or an assumption schema. 
The concepts give access to three types of entries: lexical, logical and 
encyclopaedic. Lexical entry provides information about the natural language 
counterpart of the concept. Logical entry consists of a set of deductive rules, 
which  apply  to  logical  forms  of  which  that  concept  is  a  constituent. 
Encyclopaedic entry stores information about the extension and/or denotation 
of  the  given  concept.  The  entries  in  turn  give  rise  to  two  types  of 
implications.  
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Analytic  implications  serve  to  understand  what  is  said  and  are  of  no 
interest for the present analysis. Synthetic implications are called contextual 
implications and are defined in the following way: 
[...] a set of assumptions P contextually implies an assumption Q in the 
context C if and only if 
(i)  the union of P and C non-trivially implies Q, 
(ii)  P does not non-trivially imply Q, 
(iii)  C does not non-trivially imply Q. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1996:107–108) 
 
In the course of the inference hearer has to supply implicated premises by 
either  retrieving  them  from  memory  or  constructing  them  using  assumption 
schemas. Finally, the hearer deduces implicated conclusions from explicature of 
an utterance and the context, which is provided by implicated premises. The 
deductive processes follow two basic deductive rules: 
Modus ponendo ponens – Input: (i) P 
 (ii) if P then Q 
Output: Q 
Modus tollendo ponens – Input: (i) (P or Q) 
 (ii) (not Q) 
Output: P 
(Sperber and Wilson 1996:87) 
 
Sperber  and  Wilson  (1986)  propose  their  own  account  of  the  inference 
process, where deduction plays crucial role in the recovery of implicatures. No 
implicature  can  be  deduced  from  the  explicit  content  of  the  utterance  alone, 
therefore background knowledge is indispensable. Since premises are essential 
part of implicature derivation it is important to show the grounds for selecting 
the appropriate premises for the deduction process and evaluation of the potential 
conclusions. 
The  principle  of  relevance  presupposes  that  an  utterance  addressed  to 
someone  automatically  conveys  a  presumption  of  its  own  relevance. 
Presumption of relevance comprises: presumption of adequate cognitive effect 
and presumption of minimally necessary processing effort.  
Special effects of an utterance are specified as follows: utterance achieves 
most of its relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures. 
Authors (Sperber and Wilson (1988)) point out that firstly, utterances and the 
thoughts they represent are not always identical to their propositional form and 
attitude  (e.g.  in  loose  talk  and  metaphor).  Secondly,  thoughts  do  not  always 
represent states of affairs, they may represent other thoughts (e.g. in irony and 
interrogatives).  To  account  for  the  cases  the  authors  introduce  the  notion  of 
interpretative resemblance, which is defined as follows:  
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In context {C} a proposition P may have contextual implications. Two propositions P and Q 
(and,  by  extension,  two  representations  with  P  and  Q  as  their  propositional  content) 
interpretatively resemble one another in a context {C} to the extent that they share their analytic 
and contextual implications in the context {C}. (Sperber and Wilson 1986:542) 
Interpretative  resemblance  (Sperber  and Wilson  (1986))  is  a  comparative 
notion since each case can be put on a scale from no resemblance at all, (no 
shared  implications),  to  full  propositional  identity.  If  two  representations  are 
identical in their propositional content and consequently share all their analytic 
implications, therefore they also share all their contextual implicatures in every 
context.  Any  utterance  (Sperber  and  Wilson  (1981))  which  interpretatively 
represents a thought, and also conveys an expression of an attitude, is called an 
echoic utterance.  
Data 
The data used for the present analysis consist of two types: political speech 
corpora  and  a  general  conversation  corpus,  both  in  Polish.  The  corpora  of 
political  speech  were  recorded  during  the  first  and  second  day  of  media 
campaign for the local government election in Poland in 1998. It consists of 
programmes  of  two  political  parties;  each  lasts  5  minutes  but  they  contain 
different  number  of  words.  Solidarity  Election  Action  (Akcja  Wyborcza 
Solidarność), henceforth AWS, in its first programme has 530 words and in the 
second 479; and Union of Freedom (Unia Wolności), henceforth UW, 706 and 
704 respectively. The difference in word number is due to short mute cartoons 
incorporated into AWS programmes. 
The general conversation corpus was recorded during a social gathering of 
four people at the author’s house on 05.09.1999. It consists of 2266 words and 
lasts  13  minutes.  In  order  to  increase  the  authenticity  of  the  material  the 
participants were not informed about the recording. 
The two types of the data are fully comparable in length and content. All 
the four political programmes have a form of an interview in which at least 
three people take part. The context for political speech corpus contains: bills 
passed to start the reforms  and the  election,  protests of  communities. Most 
importantly,  it  also  comprises  important  party  actions  and  economic  issues 
connected  with  the  reform,  which  introduced  new  administrative  division, 
(which,  in  turn,  required  the  local  government  election).  The  context  for 
general  conversation  includes  the  immediate  physical  context  and  basic 
characteristics of the participants. 
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Sample analysis 
In  the  course  of  the  analysis  six  elements  were  taken  into  account:  (i) 
implications,  (ii)  special  linguistic  means,  (iii)  forms  of  address,  (iv)  style  and 
register, (v) relations between participants and (vi) general construction. 
In the sample analysis section of the article both corpora (political speech 
and general conversation) are analysed. 
– AWS – 
Abbreviations: 
L – Krzysztof Luft (host, AWS) 
J – Jacek Janiszewski (guest, AWS) 
Word | word – longer pause 
EK  –  encyclopaedic  knowledge  –  what  comes  from  the  activation  of  the 
encyclopaedic entries for concepts anchored in the given utterance. 
GK – general knowledge – what comes from the activation of the encyclopaedic 
entries for concepts not anchored in the given utterance. 
LK – logical knowledge – what comes from the activation of the logical entry for 
concepts anchored in the given utterance. 
Lex. K – lexical knowledge – what comes from the activation of the lexical entry 
for concepts anchored in the given utterance. 
 
L – Panie ministrze za nami jest alfabet, w kaŜdym alfabecie jest równieŜ 
litera R jak rolnictwo czy jak reformy...  
L – literally, Mister, minister behind us is alphabet, in every alphabet is also 
letter R as ‘agriculture’ or as ‘reforms’... 
 
(i)  IMPLICATIONS 
Implicated premises:  
1.  If something is alphabet, then it is basic. (GK/EK) 
2.  It is alfabet (an alphabet). 
Implicated conclusion: It is basic. 
 
1.  If something is basic, then it is very important. (LK/EK) 
2.  It is basic. 
Implicated conclusion: It is very important. 
 
1.  If something is a letter R, then it is a part of an alphabet. (EK) 
2.  It is a letter R. 
Implicated conclusion: It is a part of alphabet.  
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1.  If X is jak (as) Y, then X and Y have some common features. (GK)  
2.  X is like Y. 
Implicated conclusion: X and Y have some common features. 
Contextual  implication:  Agriculture  and  reforms  are  basic,  therefore  very 
important. 
 
(ii)  SPECIAL LINGUISTIC MEANS 
Implicated premise: If someone says that X is jak (as) Y, then he uses a simile. 
(GK) 
L says that R is like agriculture or like reforms. 
Implicated conclusion: L uses a simile. 
 
(iii) FORMS OF ADDRESS 
Implicated premise: If someone is called panie ministrze (“mister, minister”), then 
he is treated formally and his status is stressed. (Lex. K/EK) 
Implicated conclusion: J is treated formally and his status is stressed. 
 
(iv)  STYLE AND REGISTER 
Implicated premise: If someone addresses a minister panie ministrze – vocative 
case form (“mister, minister”), then he uses formal style. (Lex. K/EK) 
Implicated conclusion: L uses formal style. 
 
(v)  RELATION AMONG PARTICIPANTS AND GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
The two parts of the analysis cannot be carried out on the sample utterance since 
their nature requires a complete interview for analysis.  
– UW – 
Abbreviations: 
A – Andrzej Potocki (host, UW) 
 
A – A naszym specjalnym gościem dzisiaj | jest | pan Juliusz Braun, 
który przez wiele kadencji jako poseł przewodniczący komisji kultury dbał 
o to by w kaŜdym mieście i w kaŜdej gminie wszystkie inicjatywy które na to 
zasługują  |  znajdowały  właściwe  wsparcie  i  właściwe  miejsce  w  lokalnej 
kulturze. 
A – literally, And our special guest today is | Mr. Juliusz Braun who through 
many terms of office as an MP | the chairman of the Culture Committee | saw to 
it that in every town and in every district all initiatives which deserve it, found 
the right support and the right place in the local culture.  
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(i) IMPLICATIONS 
Implicated premises: 
1.  If  somebody  is  specjalny  gość  (literally,  “special  guest”),  then  he  is 
somebody important. (EK) 
2.  If somebody is a poseł (literally, “an MP”), then he is somebody who has 
some privileges and enough money. (GK)  
3.  If one was przewodniczący komisji kultury (literally, “the chairman of the 
Culture Committee”), then he should know at least problems of culture. 
(GK) 
4.  If somebody dbał (literally, “saw to”) something, then he worked to ensure 
progress of it. (EK) 
5.  If something is done w kaŜdym mieście i w kaŜdej gminie (literally, “in every 
town and in every district”), then it is done everywhere in Poland. (GK) 
6.  Both  towns  and  districts  cover  the  administrative  division  of  Poland. 
(external context)  
7.  If somebody did something everywhere in Poland, then it is more than it was 
possible. (GK) 
8.  If somebody says he did more than it was possible, it is a hyperbole. (GK) 
9.  If somebody cares for wszystkie (literally, “all”) deserving initiatives, then he 
cares for every cultural initiative that deserves caring for. (LK)  
10. If every, then without any exception. (LK) 
11. One cannot care for every cultural initiative that deserves caring for. (GK) 
12. If somebody says he did more than it was possible, it is a hyperbole. (GK)  
13. If somebody cares for właściwe (literally, “the right”) support and place of 
something, then he cares for the right help and attention for something. 
(LK) 
Contextual implications: we are going to talk to somebody special, somebody 
who  has  enough  money  and  who  should  know  the  problems  of  culture,  and 
somebody who greatly helped culture to develop. 
 
(ii) SPECIAL LINGUISTIC MEANS 
In the sample utterance there are two hyperbolas (in every town and in every 
district  and the  right  support  and the  right  place).  The  second  example  of 
hyperbole  is  also  an  instance  of  repetition  of  structure,  which  is  used  for 
emphasis. The expression is also an instance of loose talk or vagueness since it 
is highly subjective what is or is not the right support or place.  
 
(iii) FORMS OF ADDRESS  
Implicated premise: If an MP is called pan (literally, “mister”), then he is not 
treated formally. (Lex. K/EK) 
Implicated conclusion: B is not treated formally. 
(iv) STYLE AND REGISTER  
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Implicated premise: If someone says specjalny (literally, “special”), then he uses 
consultative style. (Lex. K/EK) 
Implicated conclusion: A uses consultative style.  
 
(iv) RELATIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS and GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
The two parts of the analysis cannot be carried out on the sample utterance since 
their nature requires a complete interview for analysis.  
– General Conversation – 
Abbreviations: 
P – Guest, woman, aged 25, in her last years of archaeology studies in Warsaw, 
engaged to B, attended primary school with D. 
B – Guest, man, aged 25, graduated form Rzeszów Polytechnic, engaged with P. 
T – Host, man, aged 25, graduated form Rzeszów Polytechnic, husband of D. 
 
(1) T – trafiliście nie pomyliliście się 
T – literally did you get here, didn’t you wonder  
(2) B – a dlaczego mielibyśmy się pomylić 
B – why should we wonder  
(3) T – przez, przez te przez tą kostkę 
T – because, because that, because this new pavement 
(4) P – nie, nie bo mi D mówiła Ŝe kostka jest układana  
P – no, no because D said that the new pavement is laid  
(5) B – a wy myśleliście Ŝe my tam na koniec poszliśmy 
B – and you thought that we went there till the end 
 
(i) IMPLICATED PREMISES TO INDIVIDUAL UTTERANCES: 
 
Implicated premises to utterance (1): 
1.  If the host asks whether the guests got to the host’s house without problems, 
then the guests are in the host’s house for the first time. (GK) 
2.  The guests are NOT in the host’s house for the first time. (context) 
3.  If the host asks about problems, then there must be some other factors that 
made getting to the host’s house difficult. 
Implicated conclusion:  
There are some other factors that made getting to the host’s house difficult. 
Implicated premises: 
1.  If the old pavement is replaced with the new one, it is a new element of 
environment, which could make getting to the host’s house difficult. (GK)  
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2.  If T is sane, then he does not believe that new pavement can make getting to 
his house difficult. (GK) 
3.  T is sane. 
Implicated conclusion: T does not believe that new pavement can make getting 
to his house difficult. 
Implicated premises: 
1.  If  T  does  not  believe  that  new  pavement  can  make  getting  to  his  house 
difficult, then he must be asking about something else. (GK) 
2.  T  does  not  believe  that  new  pavement  can  make  getting  to  his  house 
difficult. 
Implicated conclusion: T must be asking about something else. 
Implicated premises: 
1.  If somebody gets something new, he wants it to be noticed. (GK) 
2.  T got a new pavement.   
Implicated conclusion: T wants the new pavement to be noticed. 
Implicated premises to utterance (2): 
1.  If B is not commenting on the new pavement, then he has not derived the 
contextual implication from T’s previous utterance. (GK) 
2.  B is not commenting on the new pavement. 
Implicated  conclusion:  B  has  not  derived  the  implicature  from  T’s  previous 
utterance. 
Implicated premises to utterance (3): 
1.  If the hearer has not derived the contextual implication, then the speaker 
should make it possible for the hearer to derive it. (GK) 
2.  B has not derived the implicature from T’s previous utterance. 
Implicated  conclusion:  T  makes  it  possible  for  B  to  derive  the  contextual 
implication. 
Implicated premises to utterance (4): 
1.  If  somebody  has  been  informed  about  something  new,  then  he  is  not 
surprised to find it later. (GK) 
2.  P and B have been informed that the pavement is being changed. 
Implicated conclusion: P and B are not surprised to find that the pavement is 
being changed. 
1.  If something is known, it is not verbally noticed. (GK) 
2.  P and B knew about the new pavement.  
Implicated conclusion: P and B do not verbally notice the new pavement. 
Implicated premises to utterance (5): 
1.  If X echoes Y’s thought dissociating himself from the opinion echoed, then 
Y is using irony. (GK) 
2.  B echoes T’s thought about B and P’s getting lost dissociating himself from 
the opinion echoed.  
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Implicated conclusion: B uses irony.  
 
(ii) SPECIAL LINGUISTIC MEANS 
In  the  general  conversation  sample  analysis  there  is  an  instance  of  indirect 
speech (did you get here, didn’t you wonder), irony (and you thought that we 
went there till the end), ellipsis (till the end) and repetition (because, because 
that, because this).  
 
(iii) FORMS OF ADDRESS 
In the sample analysis the form you is used.  
 
(iv) STYLE AND REGISTER 
Implicated premise: If someone says trafiliście (literally, “get here”), then he 
uses colloquial style. (Lex. K/EK) 
Implicated conclusion: T uses colloquial style. 
 
(v) RELATIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS and GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
The two parts of the analysis cannot be carried out on the sample utterance since 
their nature requires a complete text for analysis.  
Conclusion 
The conclusions follow from the analyses of the full corpora and have the 
same elements as the sample analysis, i.e. (i) implications, (ii) special linguistic 
means,  (iii)  forms  of  address,  (iv)  style  and  register,  (v)  relations  between 
participants  and  (vi)  general  construction.  They  constitute  the  basis  for 
comparison  of  political  speech  with  general  conversation  as  well  as  the 
comparison of the two types of rhetoric of the two political parties represented 
by their campaign programmes.  
 
(i) CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS  
The implications are more difficult to draw in the first programme of AWS 
than in the second one, however, they require a lot of knowledge of external 
context in both cases.  
Implications required less effort in the programmes of UW since topics of 
local culture and investing are close to everyone. Everyday speech was used for 
most of the programme.  
Interpreting  general  conversation  required  drawing  more  complex 
implicatures but not difficult provided that the correct contextual information 
was  supplied.  Contextual  information  needed  consists  of  immediate  context, 
information about participants and general knowledge.   
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(ii) SPECIAL LINGUISTIC MEANS 
Most  frequent  linguistic  means  in  the  programme  of AWS  were:  special 
collocations,  repetition  and  metaphors.  The  special  collocations  used  are 
characteristic of the language of news. However, metaphors are not numerous 
and all are dead metaphors.  
In the programme of UW the linguistic means are diverse serving several 
functions. Repetitions stress the most important elements of an utterance and 
clarify it. A few cases of hyperbole serve to stress the most important ideas. The 
choice of collocations and metaphors is characteristic of everyday speech. In the 
second programme there is also a case of irony and pun.  
In general conversation corpus most frequent are irony and repetition, there 
are  also  ellipsis,  puns,  a  few  hyperbolas,  rarely  metaphors  and  instances  of 
mixture of forms in one expression.  
(iii) FORMS OF ADDRESS 
Although in the programme of AWS forms of address are formal or very 
formal, the guests are addressed panowie (literally, “misters”). There are no cases 
of a host addressing the other host in both programmes.  
In the programme of UW different address forms are used. At the beginning 
the formal status is retained but as the programme proceeds it changes to less 
formal. The hosts address each other very informally.  
In the corpus of general conversation you form is used since there is no 
status or formal situation to be indicated. There is also a case of using name to 
address the hearer. 
 
(iv) STYLE AND REGISTER 
The first programme of AWS is more formal due to the style used by the 
guest;  the  second  programme  is  less  formal.  The  collocations  used  in  both 
programmes are schematic, frozen and characteristic of the news.  
The programme of UW presents a mixture of consultative and formal style. 
Generally,  the  beginning  of  the  programme  is  formal,  then  it  changes  into 
consultative one. The collocations are schematic and mostly frozen, there are 
cases of new collocations and the use of pun, irony and new metaphors. 
In  the  corpus  of  general  conversation  colloquial  style  is  used,  rarely 
changing to consultative. 
 
(v) RELATION AMONG PARTICIPANTS 
Relations  among  participants  are  analysed  on  the  basis  of  the  forms  of 
address used in the programmes. In the programme of AWS the two hosts do not 
address each other, so the relation between them cannot be determined. In the 
first programme the relation between them and the guest is formal, in the second 
one it is less formal due to the young age of the guests.   
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The relation between the hosts is very close in the programme of UW. Only 
at  the  beginning  the  relation  between  them  and  the  guests  is  formal,  then  it 
changes into consultative during the programmes. 
The relation among participants of general conversation corpus is very close. 
 
(vi) GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROGRAMMES 
AWS  starts  their  programme  with  an  introduction  of  the  topic  and  the 
introduction  of  the  guest.  There  are  only  two  questions  asked,  the  first  by 
Krzysztof Luft, and the second by Damian Łuszczyszyn, therefore the guest has 
the longest talking time and the talking times of the hosts are almost equal. In the 
second programme of AWS, there is no topic, the guests are introduced, and two 
questions are asked, both by Krzysztof Luft. The interview is interrupted twice 
by  a  short  slogan  encouraging  to  vote  for  young  candidates  and  once  by  a 
cartoon. The programme is finished with a song.  
UW starts with a slogan and a song, then in the studio hosts introduce each 
other,  and  finally Andrzej  Potocki  introduces  the  guest. The  question-answer 
sequences are rather short (7 and 5 in both programmes respectively), hosts take 
turns in asking questions. The longest talking time is the one of the guest, next is 
Andrzej Potocki and the shortest talking time belongs to Małgorzata Potocka. 
The second programme has a similar construction, however, it is finished with 
two short films followed by the slogan.  
There is no unified topic in the corpus of general conversation as well as 
turn taking is not restricted. Questions are rarely used. There is a case of two 
parallel conversations. The exchanges are mostly short (except for descriptions), 
full of pauses or laughs.  
Overall conclusions 
On the basis of the thorough analysis it is legitimate to state that the theory 
of relevance is sufficient enough to show differences between political speech 
and general conversation as well as to differentiate between styles of the two 
political parties. The theory of relevance also possesses sufficient explanatory 
power  to  display  differences  between  two  political  speech  rhetoric,  which  is 
evident in register and forms of address used; the latter ones reflect the attitude 
of the speakers to the hearers. 
The  differences  between  political  speech  and  general  conversation  are 
mostly due to the situation and purpose of the conversations; e.g. the restricted 
form of the political programmes resulted in fixed question-answer sequences or 
only one topic discussed.   
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Nevertheless,  there  are  differences  between  political  speech  and  general 
conversation,  which  arise  mostly  due  to  the  different  language  style/register 
used; e.g. the frequency of linguistic means or the complexity of implicatures.  
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